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A growing body of evidence suggests that cognition is embodied and
grounded. Abstract concepts, though, remain a significant theoretical chal-
lenge. A number of researchers have proposed that language makes an
important contribution to our capacity to acquire and employ concepts,
particularly abstract ones. In this essay, I critically examine this suggestion
and ultimately defend a version of it. I argue that a successful account of
how language augments cognition should emphasize its symbolic properties
and incorporate a view of embodiment that recognizes the flexible, multi-
modal and task-related nature of action, emotion and perception systems.
On this view, language is an ontogenetically disruptive cognitive technology
that expands our conceptual reach.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts:
development, use and representation in the brain’.1. Introduction
What is the role of the language system in embodied cognition? This paper offers a
theoretical framework for answering this pressing question. Building on Andy
Clark’s suggestion that we are natural-born cyborgs [1], it proposes that language
can be thought of as a disruptive cognitive technology that transforms the embo-
died mind. Just as the adoption of new technologies often upends our social,
cultural and economic lives, the acquisition of a natural language alters a child’s
cognitive purview. It disrupts embodied cognition by offering a new medium
through which to capture experience [2]. Experience with language leads to the
development of a distributed neural system able to manipulate linguistic symbols
in a compositional and productive fashion. The neurologically realized language
system amounts to a distributed action/perception control system that likely
relies on hierarchically organized network hubs. Linguistic forms themselves are
grounded because they involve actions, sights and sounds, but they are free to
capture content in a manner that is not tied to their grounding [3].
On this view, language is an external symbol system—one that has the
computational features associated with amodal symbol systems—that we learn
to manipulate in an embodied and grounded way. It is just one of the externally
sourced symbol technologies that we may acquire [4]. For example, learning how
to perform long division on paper requires a similar grounded manipulation of,
and interactionwith, physical symbols [5,6]. The specialness of language has to do
with the pervasive role that it plays in our cognitive lives and the way in which it
complements embodied cognition by enhancing our capacity to encode infor-
mation about the world that goes beyond our immediate experience. This
proposal creates a number of predictions. First and foremost, it predicts that
much of our conceptual system is not grounded in language but is instead directly
grounded in action, emotion and perception systems. Importantly, such thinking
withoutwords has its own compositionality and productivity [7,8]. Second,while
language is likely to contribute to all types of concepts, it is more likely to be help-
ful with abstract ones. Third, as a cognitive tool, the role of language should be
flexible, context-sensitive and experience-dependent. Finally, because a natural
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.T
2language is an acquired neuroenhancement, its influence
should change over the course of development.
The purpose of this essay is to outline and defend the dis-
ruptive technology view. The argument proceeds at two
levels: the general and the specific. While much of the essay
is aimed at the big picture and endeavours to show that the
neuroenhancement view integrates and unifies seemingly
disparate threads of current research, the last section exam-
ines the way in which it offers a promising explanation of a
particular linguistic/conceptual phenomenon—metaphor.
Together these elements provide a compelling case for think-
ing that language augments and extends the cognitive reach
of the embodied mind. rans.R.Soc.B
373:201701352. Embodiment
The idea that our concepts are fundamentally embodied has
gained a great deal of currency in the psychological and
brain sciences. Many hold that the neural mechanisms typi-
cally used to experience the world are also used to think
about it. By these lights, cognition involves the selective reuse
of action, emotion and perception systems to carry out situated
simulations of our experience [9,10]. Because of their distal con-
nection to experience, abstract concepts represent a particular
challenge for this approach [11]. In this essay, I explore and
defend the notion that language provides an especially impor-
tant scaffold for embodied concepts in general and abstract
ones in particular.
A diverse bodyof evidence supports the thesis that our con-
cepts are embodied and grounded [9,10,12]. For example,
Pecher et al. [13] find a modality-switching cost associated
with a property verification task. Participants verified verbally
expressed facts involving one modality (such as the fact that
leaves rustle) more rapidly after verifying a fact involving the
same modality (such as the fact that blenders make noise) than
after verifying a fact involving a different modality (such as
the fact that cranberries are tart). Hearing motion-related verbs
interferes with visual motion processing [14] and visual
motion processing interferes with the processing of motion-
related verbs [15]. Neuroimaging data provide further evi-
dence of conceptual embodiment. Reading odour-related
words (e.g. cinnamon, garlic and jasmine) elicits increased acti-
vation in the primary olfactory cortex relative to neutral control
words [16], and reading action words (e.g. lick, pick and kick)
elicits increased activation in the cortical regions associated
with performing the relevant movements [17]. The specificity
of the modulated activity can be quite fine-grained. Right-
and left-handers exhibit increased activation in the premotor
areas that are contralateral to their dominant hands on lexical
decisions involving manual action verbs [18]. In addition, the
degree to which expert hockey players comprehend hockey-
action sentences better than controls correlates positively
with activity in the left dorsal premotor cortex [19].3. The trouble with abstract concepts
All concepts involve abstraction. Horizontal generalization from
individual exemplars (e.g. specific dogs) to categories (e.g. the
category of dog) lies at the very heart of conceptualization. Ver-
tical generalization linking categories together creates conceptual
hierarchies (e.g. pugs are a type of dog and dogs are a type of
animal). The ubiquity of abstraction suggests that abstractconcepts such as DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM, LEPTON,
NUMBER and TRUTHmay simply represent one end of a spec-
trum. Researchers often demarcate abstract concepts by one of
severalmeasures, includingbody–object interaction [20], concre-
teness [21], context-availability [22], emotional valence [23],
imageability [24], semantic richness [25] and strength of percep-
tual experience [26]. Importantly, while thesemeasures correlate
to some extent, they are not equivalent [23]. Such divergence
suggests that abstract concepts may form a heterogeneous
class. Indeed, a cogent argument can be made that researchers
have been too cavalier in assuming that abstract concepts are
homogeneous [27]. In this paper, I shall not make this assump-
tion. My argument will simply be that language has an
important role to play in concepts in general and abstract con-
cepts in particular. This role may ultimately contribute to a
pluralistic account of abstract concepts.
When compared with concrete concepts, abstract concepts
tend to refer to entities or events that are harder to perceive
with our senses or manipulate with our actions [28], to involve
more complex relations, introspective features or social inter-
actions [7,9] and to exhibit greater variability across contexts
[29]. Evidence suggests that they may be processed in a differ-
entmanner fromother concepts. For instance, abstractwords in
a semantic categorization task are associated with a particu-
larly widespread pattern of cortical activation that includes
temporal, parietal and frontal regions [30]. This distributed pat-
tern could be explained by the reliance of abstract concepts on a
network of association areas [31].
All of this raises a difficult question: How can one capture
abstract content using grounded mechanisms? Certainly, one
of the purported benefits of embodiment [7,32,33] is its ability
to overcome the symbol grounding problem [34]. This problem
arises because a system containing only abstract symbols and
their interrelations struggles to explain how individual rep-
resentations come to be associated with objects and events in
the world. Supporters of embodiment propose that this pro-
blem is overcome by the experiential connections between the
representations of modality-specific sensorimotor systems and
our external environment (both physical and social). This
benefit may come with a cost, however, because represen-
tational systems containing only modality-specific symbols
face a corresponding symbol ungrounding problem [11]: that is,
any theory that posits a central role for experiential mechanisms
in our concepts must explain how we are able to acquire and
understand concepts that go beyond our experience [35–37].4. The role of language
Although, much of the initial research implicating sensorimo-
tor and affective systems has focused on concrete concepts,
researchers have begun to investigate tasks involving abstract
ones. Evidence has come to light that implicates action
[38,39] and emotion [23] systems with the processing of these
concepts. As things stand, though, there is insufficient reason
to think that abstract concepts rely exclusively on affective
and motor activations. A number of theories propose that the
language system, or at least our experience of language, plays
a significant role in our conceptual system. Examples include
embodied conceptual combination theory (ECCo) [40],
language and situated simulation theory (LASS) [41], symbol
interdependency theory [42] and word as social tool theory
(WAT) [43]. Because I do not have the space to critically
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3evaluate each of these theories (for reviews, see [28,44]), my
strategy instead will be to examine the core generalizations
behind them and then offer an overarching theory that inte-
grates these generalizations and exhibits both explanatory
and predictive power.
Embodied cognition posits an intimate link between
cognition and experience, and a great deal of our experience
is with language itself. Some have proposed that this raises
the possibility of merging embodied and distributional
approaches to word meaning [42,45–47]. Traditionally, these
approaches have been viewed as competitors; embodied
accounts have focused on situated interactions with the world
and distributional accounts have focused on formal relation-
ships between symbols [39]. Distributional models treat
concepts in terms of knowledge of statistical patterns derived
fromspoken andwritten language. In addition to beingparticu-
larly effective at capturing abstract concepts, they have enjoyed
some success in explaining performance on both lexical access
and lexical similarity tasks [48]. However, because they
depend on the statistical relationships between abstract
symbols, they struggle to overcome the symbol grounding pro-
blem [32]. Recognizing that linguistic and non-linguistic
experiences can be treated as independent, yet complementary,
sources of information about the world, several researchers
have proposed that these approaches can be combined
[42,45,47]. Indeed, there have been several demonstrations
that hybrid embodied/distributional models can outperform
similar models that limit themselves to either embodied or dis-
tributional information alone [49–51]. Furthermore, several
behavioural studies identify independent language-based and
embodied factors in conceptual processing [41,42].
Other theorists have explored the idea that linguistic forms
themselves might influence embodied conceptualization. In
one of the most detailed attempts to model the neurological
mechanisms responsible for connecting the language and con-
ceptual systems, Pulvermu¨ller [52,53] proposes that linguistic
forms play a constitutive role in the formation of action percep-
tion circuits. Learning a language, on this account, leads to the
formation of these distributed circuits by means of Hebbian
and anti-Hebbian mechanisms. In other words, linguistic
forms serve as ameans of stabilizing and organizing grounded
representations. Lupyan & Bergen [54] similarly argue that
language acts as a control system that, in their words, ‘pro-
grammes the mind’ by enabling the active manipulation of
sensorimotor representations. This conception builds on pre-
vious behavioural data demonstrating that verbal cues (such
as the spoken word dog) activate more general representations
than non-verbal cues (such as the sound of a dog barking)
[55,56]. What unites the different instances of this second
type of approach is the recognition that an important feedback
relationshipmay exist between linguistic forms and sensorimo-
tor simulations [57].
A third approach emphasizes the role that the social experi-
ence of language plays in shaping our concepts. The most
prominent version of this approach is the WAT theory [27].
This theory has four main tenets [28]. The first is that
language—broadly construed to include pragmatic and
discourse-related elements—is likely to play a greater scaffold-
ing role in abstract concepts than in concrete ones. This tenet
accords with psycholinguistic evidence on modality of acqui-
sition indicating that the acquisition of abstract words tends
to rely more on linguistic input and less on sensorimotor
experience than other words [58]. The second tenet isthat differences in the modality of acquisition should lead to
differences in how concepts are neurobiologically realized.
In particular, WAT theory predicts that abstract concepts
should exhibit a greater tendency to engage language areas
[59,60]. The third tenet is that these neuroanatomical differ-
ences should lead to differences in embodiment: namely, the
sensorimotor systems associated with speech production and
perception should be more engaged by abstract concepts [61].
Finally, because of their greater reliance on linguistic
input, abstract concepts should exhibit greater cross-linguistic
variability than concrete ones.
In sum, there are at least three distinct general conceptions
in the literature of how language may augment our embodied
cognitive abilities and help with abstract concepts. The first
focuses on our language-based experience as an additional
source of information about our physical and social worlds.
On this conception, implicit knowledge of distributional pat-
terns may scaffold certain cognitive activities. The second
focuses on the way in which linguistic forms can facilitate
and organize the neural implementation of our concepts.
On this conception, language transforms the very neural
mechanisms responsible for cognition. The third focuses on
the social dimension of language acquisition. On this concep-
tion, language leverages our intersubjective experience to
expand our cognitive horizons. Below I offer an account
of how language augments cognition that combines and
integrates these conceptions.5. A theoretical dilemma
The task before us is to provide a theoretical framework for
understanding the contribution of the language system to
our concepts. I suggest that previous accounts face something
of a theoretical dilemma: they tend to be guilty of either sins
of omission or sins of commission with respect to the funda-
mental properties of the language system. The relevant sins of
omission generally involve a failure to provide a rich enough
account of what makes language special. Too often embodied
theories make little mention of the structural properties of the
language system and their connection to its ability to capture
semantic content. Sins of commission are often associated
with fuller accounts of the language system, because they
tend to involve, either explicitly or implicitly, amodal rep-
resentations that capture these all important structural
properties. Such amodal representations seem incompatible
with the basic tenets of embodied cognition [62].
I am going to adopt a twofold strategy in response to this
dilemma. The first part involves outlining an expanded
notion of embodiment that emphasizes the flexible character
of the distributed representations employed in conceptual
tasks. This expanded notion requires an embrace of what has
become known as weak embodiment [63]. In strongly embo-
died theories, sensorimotor systems are directly implicated in
conceptual processing [64,65]. Completely disembodied theo-
ries, on the other hand, locate concepts in amodal systems
and view sensorimotor activations as epiphenomenal conse-
quences of conceptual processing [37,66]. Weakly embodied
theories retain a commitment to the proposition that concep-
tual representations are constituted at least in part by activity
in sensorimotor systems while granting that dynamically co-
ordinated activity across multiple distributed regions is
central to cognition. Such theories often include activity in
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.or
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hubs [68,69]. This perspective should not be seen as completely
novel or radical. Indeed, several recent reviews [11,63,70]
suggest that weak embodiment has become the favoured
view among supporters of embodied and grounded cognition.
The second part of my strategy involves developing a theoreti-
cal account of the way in which our experience with language
augments our concepts. The key idea will be that language not
only provides access to new sources of information about the
world, but also transforms us as thinkers. g
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
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Oneof the challenges facing embodied cognition is that embodi-
ment means different things to different people. Broadly
speaking, embodied approaches can be divided into one of
two major categories: those that emphasize the influence of
the body on the mind and those that emphasize the importance
of body–world couplings. What we need is a framework for
understanding embodied cognition that integrates ideas about
embodiment that focus on body–mind connections with ideas
about embodiment that focus on body–world connections. I
offer two core conjectures: (i) that adaptive neural reuse is a cen-
tral feature of the brain mechanisms responsible for cognition
and (ii) that manipulation of external resources often serves to
scaffold our cognitive endeavours. Rather than focusing exclu-
sively on the contribution of sensory and motor areas, my
approach focuses also on the context-sensitivity assumed by
many embodied accounts of concepts [71,72]. It fits well with
the growing evidence that conceptual representations may
vary with stimulus [73,74], task [75–77] and context [78,79].
This framework identifies a number of characteristic fea-
tures of the mechanisms responsible for our concepts. First,
they are fundamentally multimodal. Not only is the interplay
between modalities essential to how we perceive and act on
theworld, it is also important to howwe conceptualize its con-
tents. Second, this interplay often depends on mechanisms
associated with the ongoing evaluation of incoming sensory
input relative to the predictions generated by the motor
system [80]. Hard-won experiential knowledge plays an
important dynamical role in embodied simulations. Third,
the selective nature of embodied simulations requires a hier-
archical neuroanatomical organization, both internal to, and
across, specific modalities [70,81]. Finally, this approach also
holds that the degree and form of embodiment is likely to
change over the course of development [82,83].
There will be some that argue that these features have been
part of their conception of embodiment all along. After all,
Barsalou [7] cites the ability to explain flexibility as a major
benefit of his approach. Moreover, Connell & Lynott [84]
contend that the dynamic influences that the body, the environ-
ment, the relevant goals and the task have on our conceptual
representations imply that ‘you can’t represent the same
concept twice’. Wilson & Golonka [71] propose that task-
dependence is a central component of embodied cognition.
My intention is not to claim exclusive priority but merely to
codify what I see as the best approach.
There will be others, though, who claim that the view out-
lined in this essay amounts to a disavowal of embodied
cognition [62]. While I disagree with this assessment, not
much hangs on this. The central role played by situated sen-
sorimotor simulations in this account seems sufficient towarrant characterizing it as form of embodied cognition.
Moreover, there is precedence for this ascription. Anderson
[85], for instance, articulates a radically interactive view of
neural reuse while explicitly remaining committed to embo-
diment. Nevertheless, one may think that the dependence
of this approach on intermediate representations undermines
the theoretical bite of embodiment [86]. My response to this
worry is similar to the one offered above: what ultimately
matters is getting the theory right. If the conjunction of the
flexible mind hypothesis and the appeal to the language
system amounts to an abandonment of authentic embodied
cognition, then so be it.7. Language as a disruptive technology
Zwaan & Madden [87] famously use a pair of analogies to
highlight the difference between traditional computational
views of cognition [88,89] and embodied ones. They liken the
computational mind to a bricklayer that assembles structures
out of well-defined mental units and the embodied mind to a
beachcomber that builds structures out of whatever has
washed up on shore. While beachcombers may shape and
modify what they find, much of the original character remains.
Situated sensorimotor simulations are similarly likely to pre-
serve aspects of their experiential origins. Without making
too much of the analogy itself (after all even driftwood is a
structure composed of smaller parts), it is worth pointing out
that one of the things that washes ashore is a collection of
bricks (i.e. language). A supporter of embodied cognition
thus faces a choice: either maintain that the language system
is completely separate from our conceptual system or provide
some explanation of how the two are integrated. Although
the first of these seems contrary to the interactive spirit of
embodied cognition, it has been the standard approach—
words, phrases and sentences have been treated as mere elici-
tors of simulations. As we have seen, though, there has been
some recent movement towards adopting the second option.
What I propose is that language is a disruptive technology
that transforms the embodied mind. This idea is intended to fit
with, and build upon, earlier proposals. Vygotsky [90] proposes
that internalized language can serve as scaffold for learning. On
his view, inner speech can help the child organize, plan and
remember actions [91]. Clark [92] emphasizes the degree to
which language is a physical transformation of our ‘cognitive
niche’ that extends the abilities of the embodied mind. The act
of labelling, for instance, may help learners become attuned to
perceptual commonalities and overcome the inherent complex-
ity and noisiness of perceptual inputs [93,94]. More broadly,
language creates a novel set of perceptual objects and targets
for action. This enables us to model the world by means of the
manipulation of an external and shared symbol system.
The suggestion on the table is that language augments
embodied cognition. Part of the impetus for this proposal is
that the symbolic character of language—the fact that it is an
externally derived symbol system that is both compositional
and productive—offers a number of potential cognitive
benefits. One of these is the common absence of a direct con-
nection between linguistic representations and their referents.
This semantic arbitrariness may help them anchor embodied
and grounded knowledge. Giving voice to this idea, Zwaan
[84] hypothesizes that distributed linguistic representations
serve as symbolic placeholders for multimodal simulations.
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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linguistic symbols are syntactically re-combinable in a way
that is independent of the combinatorial properties of
non-linguistic embodied and grounded cognition. This inde-
pendent structural flexibility may make it easier to generate
new thoughts and encode unexpected connections between
thoughts [95,96]. Developing this idea further, Lynott &
Connell [97] propose that conceptual combination arises from
the interaction between the linguistic and simulation systems.
Some researcherswhoacknowledge that linguistic represen-
tations have a role to play in conceptual tasks suggest that this
role is typically more superficial and less effective than that of
othermultimodal simulations [41,84,98]. Inparticular, linguistic
symbols are seen as a quick and dirty heuristic that can be used
when conditions do not require complex task performance. Of
course, the notion of effectiveness is itself notoriously context-
sensitive. Indeed, there are at least three problems with the
dismissive assessment offered by these theorists: First, as
symbolic placeholders, linguistic representations may be par-
ticularly effective at resolving the problem of generalization.
Recall the studies by Lupyan and co-workers [54–57] demon-
strating that verbal cues are more effective at eliciting general
representations than modality-specific cues. Second, linguistic
representations are associated with external symbols and are
thus able to leverage the social character of language. Philoso-
phers of language emphasize the degree to which the
linguistic function of labels depends in part on their ability to
track referents by means of socially determined causal links
[99,100]. Abstract concepts would seem to be particularly
good candidates for this sort of reliance on external support.
Third, given the fact that abstract concepts often involve com-
plex situations and relational properties, it is far from clear
that linguistic representations are eliminable. Although
researchers have found some surprising evidence that embo-
died and grounded representations are activated with abstract
concepts during certain tasks, thisdoesnot demonstrate that lin-
guistic representations are uninvolved. Furthermore, reviews of
functional brain imaging research implicate language-related
areas of the cortex in the processing of abstract words [59,60].
Finally, there is reason to think that linguistic representations
may be needed for concepts that directly involve language use
(e.g. ASSERT, CAJOLE and PROMISE).
Few would deny that language provides a means to gain
information about objects and events in the absence of direct
experience, and most recognize that language enables us to
leverage the knowledge of others. Much of the impetus for
pluralistic embodied approaches that incorporate the language
system is the idea that language itself can be a rich source of
information about our physical and social environment.
What distinguishes the current proposal from others is the
explicit claim that the structural properties of language are
central to its ability to augment cognition.8. A case study
Thus far, I have defended the proposal that language augments
cognition byoutlining its broad theoretical promise andpointing
to its success at integrating other current views. This proposal is
intended to provide an overarching framework for understand-
ing the role of language in our concepts. Given this, one might
wonder whether or not it has any predictive bite. In this section,
I hope to demonstrate that it does by examining a particularphenomenon in which language appears to scaffold our cogni-
tive efforts. Metaphor is important for the purposes of this
essay not only because it may play a role in the acquisition of
some abstract concepts, but also because it serves as a useful
test case for the disruptive technology approach.
Metaphor has traditionally been seen as both a source of
evidence for embodiment and a potential means of solving
the problem abstract concepts. Working from observations
concerning language use, cognitive linguists have shown that
a great deal of our discourse is organized around experiential
metaphors [101,102]. Several have proposed that we rely on
embodied conceptual metaphors to understand abstract con-
cepts [103–105]. Typically this is thought to depend on
mappings from grounded conceptual domains to abstract
ones. Perhaps the most well-attested embodied metaphor
involves understanding the passage of time as amotion follow-
ing a linear path along the back-to-front axis [106,107] or along
the left-to-right axis [108–110]. Evidence of other embodied
metaphors—such as understanding morality in terms of clean-
liness [111], power in terms of verticality [112,113] and
similarity in terms of closeness [114,115]—has also been found.
Viewing language as a neuroenhancement predicts that the
cognitive scaffolding due to conceptual metaphor will be
somewhat circumscribed, because it treats metaphor as just
one of the ways in which language can augment cognition.
This is supported by developmental psycholinguistic research
indicating that abstract concepts are part of the vocabularies of
very young children but metaphors are not [36,116,117].
Indeed, children’s comprehension of metaphor appears to
remain poor until they reach 8–10 years of age [118]. Further-
more, there are also groups of people, such as high functioning
individuals with an autism spectrum disorder, that acquire
abstract concepts despite experiencing pronounced difficulties
with metaphors [119].
According to the proposal under consideration, our use of
metaphoric simulations should be context-sensitive and task-
specific. Some available neural evidence supports this predic-
tion. A number of studies have found that metaphors and
abstract concepts elicit different patterns of activation [120–
123]. In an event-related potential (ERP) study [124], partici-
pants made upward or downward movements with marbles
as they read words that had literal (ascend and descend) or
metaphorical (inspire and defeat) vertical associations. Con-
gruency effects were found with both types of words when
the associations matched the direction of the movements, but
their time signatures were different: the effects emerged at
200–300 ms after word onset with the literal movement
words but after 500 ms with the metaphoric movement
words. Thedelaywith themetaphors suggests that the relevant
sensorimotor simulations are not automatically engaged in the
same the way that they are with the literal action words. In
keeping with the context-sensitivity and task-specificity
found generally in embodied concepts [72], attention appears
to influence congruency effects between affective evaluation
and vertical space [125]. Boroditsky & Ramscar [107] find
that people at an airport who are about to fly out or who
have just arrived tend to employ an ego-moving perspective
on time (to think of themselves moving through time) when
answering questions about moving temporal events ‘forward’
while those who are just waiting to pick someone up tend to
employ a time-moving perspective.
An additional prediction associated with the disruptive
technology view—one that is not typically associated with
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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may not engage sensorimotor simulations but rather depend on
linguistic associations. This prediction fits with the hypothesis
that somemetaphorsmayundergo a gradual process of conven-
tionalization as they become more familiar [126]. Desai et al.
[127] examine the brain activation elicited by four types of sen-
tences: literal action sentences (The instructor is grasping the
steeringwheel very tightly.), non-idiomaticmetaphor sentences
(The congress is grasping the state of affairs.), idiomatic meta-
phor sentences (The congress is grasping at straws in the
crisis.) and abstract sentences (The congress is causing a big
trade deficit again.). They found that higher-level sensorimotor
regions associatedwith the described actions showed increased
activationwith both the action and the non-idiomaticmetaphor
sentences but not with the idiomatic metaphor or abstract sen-
tences. This suggests that sensorimotor simulations are not
essential for the semantic processing of these idioms and fits
with the notion that they are ‘frozen’ metaphors whose content
is stored by means of linguistic associations.
One potential objection to the disruptive technology view is
that it seems to require a commitment to linguistic relativism
(the idea that the natural language one possesses influences
the thoughts one is likely to have). While I do not have the
space to fully address this concern, some remarks seem war-
ranted. First, a growing body of evidence supports at least a
weak form linguistic relativism [128–130]. Second, given the
centrality of non-linguistic embodied simulations to the current
account, its commitment to relativism need not be full-throated.
Third, even critics of linguistic relativism often grant that
language influences thinking-for-speaking [131]. On the current
proposal, though, the distinction between thinking and
thinking-for-speaking is blurred [2]. In sum, a compelling argu-
ment can be made that the approach advocated in this essay
strikes the right balance with respect to the influence of
language on thought. Moreover, research on embodied meta-
phors provides support for this generalization. For instance,
some behavioural studies implicate language-specific meta-
phors. Examples can be found in studies examining the time-
as-space metaphor. Research indicates that speakers of Spanish
tend to conceptualize time from left to right [110,132]. Hypothe-
sizing that this might be due in part to the orientation of their
writing system, Ouellet et al. [109] examine the responses of
speakers ofHebrew (which is read from right to left) and speak-
ers of Spanish to words presented auditorily in a temporal
judgement task. Speakers of Spanish responded quicker when
responding to words associated with the past with their left
hand and words associated with the future with their right
hand while speakers of Hebrew exhibited the opposite pattern.
While the approach advocated here predicts that experience
with particular natural languages should result in differences in
embodiedmetaphors, it also predicts that embodiedmetaphors
should be somewhat flexible and experience-dependent. This issupported by a recent experiment: after introducing a novel
metaphor connecting time and weight (the past is heavy and
the present is light), congruency effects were found in the
weight judgements of books that appeared new or old [133].
It is also supported by the fact that providing participants
with a brief exposure to mirror-reversed orthography can
reverse the orientation of the congruency effects on temporal
judgements associated with a particular language [134]. Some
recent evidence also suggests that language-specific metaphors
may build upon preexisting non-linguistic embodied map-
pings. Whereas speakers of Dutch tend to talk of musical
pitch in terms of height (the way that we do in English), speak-
ers of Farsi tend to talk of it in terms of thickness [135]. These
different linguistic metaphors appear to influence how Dutch
and Farsi speakers reproduce recently heard musical pitches
in the presence of irrelevant spatial information involving
either height or thickness [136]. A follow-up study finds that
prelinguistic infants are sensitive to both the pitch–height and
the pitch–thickness mappings [137].
Metaphor is often taken as just another data point in the
larger case for embodied cognition. Treating it as the outcome
of the interaction between an inherently flexible embodied
cognitive system and an internalized language system
enables us to go beyond the observation that some metaphors
engage action, emotion and perception systems. In particular,
it predicts that metaphor should emerge gradually in devel-
opment; be circumscribed in scope, context-sensitive and
task-specific; and involve both sensorimotor simulations of
bodily experience and linguistic associations.9. Conclusion
Abstract concepts represent a significant challenge for em-
bodied cognition. The notion that language might help
grounded agents acquire and use concepts in general, and
abstract concepts in particular, has recently gained traction.
Extant accounts, though, tend to commit one of two errors:
they either treat language as just another experiential source
of information or offer a conception of the language system
that is incompatible with embodiment and grounding. This
essay provides an account of how language scaffolds the
embodied mind in which the symbolic character of language
(underwritten by its combinatorial structural properties) is a
feature not a bug. The acquisition of a natural language not
only expands our access to information about the world,
but also serves a neuroenhancement by providing a new
medium of embodied thought.
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